The 1.5 degree pathway is clearly unrealistic at this point. But 2 degrees is easily achieved if we get to net zero by 2050 or 2060. So it seems that ultimately warming will be around 1.75 degrees give or take. Prior to 2015, the target that was widely embraced was holding temp rise to 2 degrees, but it was shifted downwards to 1.5 degrees in 2015. This coincided with revisions to projected warming that expanded the carbon budget making 1.5 degrees at least theoretically still feasible (the prior IPCC projections made a 1.5 degree target no longer possible). To what extent were these changes interlinked versus two seperate processes?
I imagine we will transition off of ICE vehicles far more rapidly than was expected even a few years ago, the Hertz purchase of Teslas and the soaring production and sales of EVs in the EU augur well. But to hit the 1.5 degree target is going to require significant DAC and negative emissions in the back half of this century. That is primarily a political question to be dealt with by the next generation. From both an engineering and cost standpoint, spending 1% of GDP for DAC annually will be more than enough to achieve the goal.
Thank you for sharing your perspectives. I believe that you've made a persuasive case that neither the widely expressed fears of inflation nor those of an “energy crisis” are well-founded, at least as currently framed. Templates using the 1970s or the 1930s don’t seem very strong, and your argument for a post-Korean war precedent seems more in order. Also, efforts to stoke fears of inflation and of an energy crisis undoubtably provide attractive narratives for conservatives; conservatives in the sense of those who want to ignore the implications of climate change and extend as far as possible our fossil fuel regime and its political economy. But allow me to pull back the focus from the immediate present and ask some questions based upon some impressions that I’ve developed. I want to explore how my conjectures fit into your analysis.
Recent figures (2019) from the U.N. reported that in 2019 the planet has 7.7 billion inhabitants, which is likely to rise to 8.5 billion in 2030 and nearly 10 billion in 2050. Barring a “Green Revolution,” an unanticipated practical, technological break-through, won’t the world’s agricultural resources be pushed to such limits that some long-term inflation of food prices will become significant and persistent? Also, given the increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events, isn’t there a marked risk that both total production may decrease and that distribution systems may be adversely affected (ports, rail, roads, etc.) and thereby continually fuel price increases in food and other consumer goods? (I’m thinking of hurricane damage to ports and landslides closing roads, such as we suffered a couple of months ago here in Colorado). You might dub this line of inquiry the “sooner or later Paul Ehrlich has to be right” conjecture.
As to “the energy crisis,” while it’s not caused by the conversion to low-or-no-carbon energy regimes, can we, via any current regime, meet current energy demands? The obvious answer is that we can meet the needs of all the developed countries and developing countries (including India and China) if we burn unlimited fossil fuels. But assuming we are not that foolish, as we taper fossil fuels, can we supply sufficient energy to fuel continued growth in the U.S. and abroad such that India and China (for instance) can close the gap with the developed nations even as those nations achieve the economic growth that they desire? In other words, I fear a significant gap between our current ability to generate “clean energy” and current (and immediate future) demands for energy. So although green energy isn’t the cause of current energy shortfalls, do we have the ability to continue to move away from fossil fuels given our current rate of consumption? (Not to mention burgeoning demand in nations like India and China.)
In about 1977 or thereabouts, John Kenneth Galbraith gave a public talk at the University of Iowa, and I was lucky enough to get to ask him a question. My question was (or was intended to ask) how our economy in the U.S. would prosper in a world of energy conservation, oil shortages, and the like. In short, in the face of decreased economic activity in general, could our current economic regime continue to prosper? Galbraith waved-off the concern implicit in my question with something along the lines of “it will all work out.” As it turned out, Jimmy Carter, “malaise,” and energy conservation were soon out, and Ronald Reagan, “It’s Morning in America,” and (after a wrenching recession) freewheeling energy consumption were back in. My question seemed only so much doom-thinking. But now this question is back, gnawing at me again. If, as Vaclav Smil, William Ophuls, Thomas Homer-Dixon, and many others have suggested, there are hard ecological limits on the amounts of stuff we can produce and consume and the amount energy that we can produce (and that the environment can accommodate) given current technology, isn’t contemporary consumer capitalism—and the political regime that's built upon it—looking at a rocky future?
Thanks very much for sharing your very informative and provocative (in the best sense!) thinking about these topics.
The 1.5 degree pathway is clearly unrealistic at this point. But 2 degrees is easily achieved if we get to net zero by 2050 or 2060. So it seems that ultimately warming will be around 1.75 degrees give or take. Prior to 2015, the target that was widely embraced was holding temp rise to 2 degrees, but it was shifted downwards to 1.5 degrees in 2015. This coincided with revisions to projected warming that expanded the carbon budget making 1.5 degrees at least theoretically still feasible (the prior IPCC projections made a 1.5 degree target no longer possible). To what extent were these changes interlinked versus two seperate processes?
I imagine we will transition off of ICE vehicles far more rapidly than was expected even a few years ago, the Hertz purchase of Teslas and the soaring production and sales of EVs in the EU augur well. But to hit the 1.5 degree target is going to require significant DAC and negative emissions in the back half of this century. That is primarily a political question to be dealt with by the next generation. From both an engineering and cost standpoint, spending 1% of GDP for DAC annually will be more than enough to achieve the goal.
Professor Tooze,
Thank you for sharing your perspectives. I believe that you've made a persuasive case that neither the widely expressed fears of inflation nor those of an “energy crisis” are well-founded, at least as currently framed. Templates using the 1970s or the 1930s don’t seem very strong, and your argument for a post-Korean war precedent seems more in order. Also, efforts to stoke fears of inflation and of an energy crisis undoubtably provide attractive narratives for conservatives; conservatives in the sense of those who want to ignore the implications of climate change and extend as far as possible our fossil fuel regime and its political economy. But allow me to pull back the focus from the immediate present and ask some questions based upon some impressions that I’ve developed. I want to explore how my conjectures fit into your analysis.
Recent figures (2019) from the U.N. reported that in 2019 the planet has 7.7 billion inhabitants, which is likely to rise to 8.5 billion in 2030 and nearly 10 billion in 2050. Barring a “Green Revolution,” an unanticipated practical, technological break-through, won’t the world’s agricultural resources be pushed to such limits that some long-term inflation of food prices will become significant and persistent? Also, given the increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events, isn’t there a marked risk that both total production may decrease and that distribution systems may be adversely affected (ports, rail, roads, etc.) and thereby continually fuel price increases in food and other consumer goods? (I’m thinking of hurricane damage to ports and landslides closing roads, such as we suffered a couple of months ago here in Colorado). You might dub this line of inquiry the “sooner or later Paul Ehrlich has to be right” conjecture.
As to “the energy crisis,” while it’s not caused by the conversion to low-or-no-carbon energy regimes, can we, via any current regime, meet current energy demands? The obvious answer is that we can meet the needs of all the developed countries and developing countries (including India and China) if we burn unlimited fossil fuels. But assuming we are not that foolish, as we taper fossil fuels, can we supply sufficient energy to fuel continued growth in the U.S. and abroad such that India and China (for instance) can close the gap with the developed nations even as those nations achieve the economic growth that they desire? In other words, I fear a significant gap between our current ability to generate “clean energy” and current (and immediate future) demands for energy. So although green energy isn’t the cause of current energy shortfalls, do we have the ability to continue to move away from fossil fuels given our current rate of consumption? (Not to mention burgeoning demand in nations like India and China.)
In about 1977 or thereabouts, John Kenneth Galbraith gave a public talk at the University of Iowa, and I was lucky enough to get to ask him a question. My question was (or was intended to ask) how our economy in the U.S. would prosper in a world of energy conservation, oil shortages, and the like. In short, in the face of decreased economic activity in general, could our current economic regime continue to prosper? Galbraith waved-off the concern implicit in my question with something along the lines of “it will all work out.” As it turned out, Jimmy Carter, “malaise,” and energy conservation were soon out, and Ronald Reagan, “It’s Morning in America,” and (after a wrenching recession) freewheeling energy consumption were back in. My question seemed only so much doom-thinking. But now this question is back, gnawing at me again. If, as Vaclav Smil, William Ophuls, Thomas Homer-Dixon, and many others have suggested, there are hard ecological limits on the amounts of stuff we can produce and consume and the amount energy that we can produce (and that the environment can accommodate) given current technology, isn’t contemporary consumer capitalism—and the political regime that's built upon it—looking at a rocky future?
Thanks very much for sharing your very informative and provocative (in the best sense!) thinking about these topics.
Brilliant. Really useful framework for understanding this intersection of urgency versus policy.