I’ve been arguing in this series of “hegemony notes” that the question of world order in the 20th century, the question of hegemony, is misunderstood if it is seen as part of a deep historical sequence that stretches back to the Middle Ages.
Masterful, and as is usually the case with Tooze, careful not to make uncautious claims about the motivations of the the players involved at the time. Readers who are interested in a more sinister interpretation of American motives during the period are encouraged to investigate Michael Hudson's "Super Imperialism. The Economic Strategy of American Empire. Third Edition" or the first few chapters of his "The Destiny of Civilization: Finance Capitalism, Industrial Capitalism or Socialism" both of which outline how the refusal of the US to forgive the war debts of its WWI allies represented a departure from previous European practice with serious consequences for the next 30 years in world history and ultimately resulting in the world-girdling dollar system and its various associated agencies (Bretton Woods, World Bank, IMF).
Somewhat related is John Perkins' "Confessions of an Economic Hit Man" exposing the mechanisms and consequences of US dollar diplomacy among Third World countries in the post-WWII era.
In the first world war, the Netherlands was neutral, contrary to the first table.
If I remember correctly (and I may not), Britain was the largest creditor nation in 1914. The US entered to war quite late and so didn't have to pay for much of it. That's how Britain turned into a debtor nation. The process was repeated in 1939. It got so bad that Britain secretly paid for its last imports, before the US joined WWII, with Belgian gold held for safekeeping in the Bank of England.
I'm not an American, so I don't really know the domestic history, but various political enthusiasms, like the pro-silver movements, made the US seem like an unsafe manager of the world monetary system.
Thanks for this fantastic post. Truly a gem. I'm just commenting to recommend it as essential reading for anyone interested in the interaction of politics and economics, twentieth century history, the history of macroeconomics, or international relations, among other fascinating and important areas. Though having some graduate education in economics, it's not my field any longer, so I'll look forward to informed comment here from those expert in the various relevant areas.
Brilliant essay! Should be "required" reading for poli sci majors, political activists, journalists, US politicians, European leaders, the Left, communists, haters and promoters of U.S.A. hegemony. Send a copy to maniacal Putin. He would probably understand it more than any of the above.
Great piece! I was hoping for more on the purchasing power pairty as intellectual scaffolidng for the postwar monetary order. Perry Mehrling does this, but doesn't historicize it perse!
Masterful, and as is usually the case with Tooze, careful not to make uncautious claims about the motivations of the the players involved at the time. Readers who are interested in a more sinister interpretation of American motives during the period are encouraged to investigate Michael Hudson's "Super Imperialism. The Economic Strategy of American Empire. Third Edition" or the first few chapters of his "The Destiny of Civilization: Finance Capitalism, Industrial Capitalism or Socialism" both of which outline how the refusal of the US to forgive the war debts of its WWI allies represented a departure from previous European practice with serious consequences for the next 30 years in world history and ultimately resulting in the world-girdling dollar system and its various associated agencies (Bretton Woods, World Bank, IMF).
Somewhat related is John Perkins' "Confessions of an Economic Hit Man" exposing the mechanisms and consequences of US dollar diplomacy among Third World countries in the post-WWII era.
Interesting. And important.
In the first world war, the Netherlands was neutral, contrary to the first table.
If I remember correctly (and I may not), Britain was the largest creditor nation in 1914. The US entered to war quite late and so didn't have to pay for much of it. That's how Britain turned into a debtor nation. The process was repeated in 1939. It got so bad that Britain secretly paid for its last imports, before the US joined WWII, with Belgian gold held for safekeeping in the Bank of England.
I'm not an American, so I don't really know the domestic history, but various political enthusiasms, like the pro-silver movements, made the US seem like an unsafe manager of the world monetary system.
Thanks for this fantastic post. Truly a gem. I'm just commenting to recommend it as essential reading for anyone interested in the interaction of politics and economics, twentieth century history, the history of macroeconomics, or international relations, among other fascinating and important areas. Though having some graduate education in economics, it's not my field any longer, so I'll look forward to informed comment here from those expert in the various relevant areas.
Do I smell a new Tooze book "Hegemony" in the offing? If not, can I request you write one based off these notes?
Brilliant essay! Should be "required" reading for poli sci majors, political activists, journalists, US politicians, European leaders, the Left, communists, haters and promoters of U.S.A. hegemony. Send a copy to maniacal Putin. He would probably understand it more than any of the above.
Great piece! I was hoping for more on the purchasing power pairty as intellectual scaffolidng for the postwar monetary order. Perry Mehrling does this, but doesn't historicize it perse!
"Irving Fischer"? Oh dear. I have to confess I stopped reading at that point. Cf "Lebesque integral",
"Cauchy-Schwartz Inequality".