The one thing missing from Tooze’s analysis is an understanding of the recurring internal political dynamics in China. Beijing didn’t pivot quickly when Omicron reached its shores: Hong Kong and Taiwan had already given a clear indication of what was sure to happen on the mainland. The reason Beijing couldn’t abandon Zero Covid sooner, o…
The one thing missing from Tooze’s analysis is an understanding of the recurring internal political dynamics in China. Beijing didn’t pivot quickly when Omicron reached its shores: Hong Kong and Taiwan had already given a clear indication of what was sure to happen on the mainland. The reason Beijing couldn’t abandon Zero Covid sooner, or even prepare people for the need for a higher vaccination rate, was because of the 20th Party Congress. This is indeed where the authoritarian political system showed its weakness. Xi couldn’t shift gears or admit that Omicron required fresh approaches because that would have required too much lateral thinking by people up and down the chain of command, and it would have raised the risk of an uncontrollable series of snafus happening in the lead up to the October 2022 Congress. He had to wait until his higher priority was taken care of, securing his political agenda for the coming decades. Maintaining tight control of the political machinery until the moment the new Standing Committee walked out on stage was more important than how many people - mostly elderly - were likely to die from Omicron. The Covid Zero policy was the most effective way of locking down local cadres and seeing who was “on side” and who wasn’t. The Party was far more concerned with the power transition than it was with preparing for Omicron.
As for the real estate market, the same thing can be said: the Party took far too long to pop the property bubble because it had been too preoccupied with its internal power struggle led by Xi. It was under Xi, in fact, that the crisis was brought to its zenith when his administration allowed property firms to resume pre-sales of unfinished apartments. Why did the Party do that? Because of the importance of political stability. It wasn’t until 2021 that Xi had accumulated enough power to implement the “three red lines”.
I’m not trying to defend Posen here - I agree with Tooze that his analysis is full of bias and flawed assumptions - but it is equally impossible to judge China’s current economic predicament without acknowledging the weakness of its political system. Inflexible policymaking can’t simply be written off to hubris, not in a country as vast and complex as China.
The one thing missing from Tooze’s analysis is an understanding of the recurring internal political dynamics in China. Beijing didn’t pivot quickly when Omicron reached its shores: Hong Kong and Taiwan had already given a clear indication of what was sure to happen on the mainland. The reason Beijing couldn’t abandon Zero Covid sooner, or even prepare people for the need for a higher vaccination rate, was because of the 20th Party Congress. This is indeed where the authoritarian political system showed its weakness. Xi couldn’t shift gears or admit that Omicron required fresh approaches because that would have required too much lateral thinking by people up and down the chain of command, and it would have raised the risk of an uncontrollable series of snafus happening in the lead up to the October 2022 Congress. He had to wait until his higher priority was taken care of, securing his political agenda for the coming decades. Maintaining tight control of the political machinery until the moment the new Standing Committee walked out on stage was more important than how many people - mostly elderly - were likely to die from Omicron. The Covid Zero policy was the most effective way of locking down local cadres and seeing who was “on side” and who wasn’t. The Party was far more concerned with the power transition than it was with preparing for Omicron.
As for the real estate market, the same thing can be said: the Party took far too long to pop the property bubble because it had been too preoccupied with its internal power struggle led by Xi. It was under Xi, in fact, that the crisis was brought to its zenith when his administration allowed property firms to resume pre-sales of unfinished apartments. Why did the Party do that? Because of the importance of political stability. It wasn’t until 2021 that Xi had accumulated enough power to implement the “three red lines”.
I’m not trying to defend Posen here - I agree with Tooze that his analysis is full of bias and flawed assumptions - but it is equally impossible to judge China’s current economic predicament without acknowledging the weakness of its political system. Inflexible policymaking can’t simply be written off to hubris, not in a country as vast and complex as China.