The Third Reich came staggeringly close to knocking the Soviet Union out of the war. Had they started their assault when they wanted to, instead of on June 22 (midsummer) they very well might have done it; Stalin put the Soviets in a state of near-total unpreparedness, through a combination of officer purges and sheer blindness to what his intelligence told him, and the Nazi war machine was tuned to a high pitch of effectiveness -- for war in summer, not the muddy fall or freezing winter.
We can thank Mussolini for the delay. He attacked Greece and was bogged down, even humiliated by their defense, and Hitler felt he could not allow an ally to fail so miserably (and maybe leave his right flank exposed). So he delayed the attack on Russia for a few precious weeks to capture Greece and drive British forces out.
Germany, Italy, and Japan had separate plans for war and were merely allies of convenience. If they had been able to co-ordinate better, they would have had more chance of winning.
After the fall of France, if Germany+Italy+Japan had all concentrated on defeating the UK, while also offering it generous terms (e.g. the British keep their empire, but Netherlands has to hand over parts of the Dutch East Indies to Japan), it's quite likely the British would have agreed to peace. If not, the axis powers would have been likely to defeat Britain before USA entered the war (if, indeed, it did enter the war).
Lest we forget, the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, also known as the Japanese–Soviet Non-aggression Pact, was a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan signed on April 13, 1941, two years after the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Border War when the Red Army there commanded by Zhukov defeated Imperial Japan's military. As a result of the Japanese defeat at Khalkhin Gol, Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941, which was similar to the German–Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939. This pact allowed Zhukov to move the Red Army west and defend Moscow by December, 1941. One more small point, on July 9, 1941 the Enigma code was broken by British intelligence.
Of course Japan could have broken the pact, just as Hitler did. Thankfully, they did not, and Richard Sorge was able to convey that message to Moscow in a timely fashion.
Read David Glanz on Germany v USSR. Also TIK on Youtube has done lot of decent vids on the eastern front.
The Germans thought the USSR would be defeated in a matter of months. A "massive" gamble.
Even in July Hitler was talking about a peace as the resistance of the Soviets was so strong - and that they totally underestimated the Soviet army's resolve, vital British aid, size, and its superior tanks. Todt was recommending a peace in Dec 1942.
The Soviets were very incompetent right though the war. Even when the Soviets won a battle the German took a heavy toll of Soviet men.
The Soviets were receiving British supplies right up to the Battle of Moscow and after. Moscow was when the Germans were stopped - going nowhere. The Soviets pushed them back.
In 1942, the British had more troops in Syria, Iraq, Levant, in case the Germans broke into the Middle East getting at the magic oil. More men were acting as a backstop for the Soviets than were fighting Rommel in North Africa. By then the USA was in the war with an agreement for the USA and British to combine forming a western front. Otherwise British troops may have moved into the eastern front from Iran, assisting the Soviets - which was talked about. The Soviets and British invaded Iran in 1941 - few know of that. The RN controlled the eastern Med.
my recent book Forging Global Fordism: Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and the Contest over the Industrial Order speaks to comparative strategies of military-industrial buildup in the two regimes. I also argue that we should move on from our fixation on Speer! Would be interested to hear your thoughts eventually.
I agree that the economic cards were always stacked against the Third Reich. But sometimes a few lucky punches can win the match. Another dimension that illustrates "why the allies won": Intelligence. Richard Sorge informed Stalin just in time in August of 1941 that Japan had no intention of helping Hitler (believing Germany would finish off the USSR easily). That allowed the USSR to transfer hundreds of thousands of battle-tested troops to the defense of Moscow. Maybe they would have won anyways, but the way it played out, these kinds of specific actions did make a difference.
I am not arguing that trying your luck is advisable. Hitler was a reckless gambler (on top of being a racist, a genocidal madman, etc.). But there is a school of historians that argues that Axis defeat was inevitable. My point was simply that this kind of determinism underestimates the role of chance in history.
"The fact that investment is smaller when measured in 1937 prices, when industrial goods were far more abundant, is indicative of how huge the transformation was."
I'm having trouble following. Do you mind clarifying?
The truth of history, so much in request, to which every body eagerly appeals, is too often but a word. At the time of the events, during the heat of conflicting passions, it cannot exist; and if, at a later period, all parties are agreed respecting it, it is because those persons who were interested in the events, those who might be able to contradict what is asserted, are no more. What then is, generally speaking, the truth of history? A fable agreed upon. As it has been very ingeniously remarked, there are, in these matters, two essential points, very distinct from each other: the positive facts, and the moral intentions.
The Third Reich came staggeringly close to knocking the Soviet Union out of the war. Had they started their assault when they wanted to, instead of on June 22 (midsummer) they very well might have done it; Stalin put the Soviets in a state of near-total unpreparedness, through a combination of officer purges and sheer blindness to what his intelligence told him, and the Nazi war machine was tuned to a high pitch of effectiveness -- for war in summer, not the muddy fall or freezing winter.
We can thank Mussolini for the delay. He attacked Greece and was bogged down, even humiliated by their defense, and Hitler felt he could not allow an ally to fail so miserably (and maybe leave his right flank exposed). So he delayed the attack on Russia for a few precious weeks to capture Greece and drive British forces out.
Germany, Italy, and Japan had separate plans for war and were merely allies of convenience. If they had been able to co-ordinate better, they would have had more chance of winning.
After the fall of France, if Germany+Italy+Japan had all concentrated on defeating the UK, while also offering it generous terms (e.g. the British keep their empire, but Netherlands has to hand over parts of the Dutch East Indies to Japan), it's quite likely the British would have agreed to peace. If not, the axis powers would have been likely to defeat Britain before USA entered the war (if, indeed, it did enter the war).
Lest we forget, the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, also known as the Japanese–Soviet Non-aggression Pact, was a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan signed on April 13, 1941, two years after the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Border War when the Red Army there commanded by Zhukov defeated Imperial Japan's military. As a result of the Japanese defeat at Khalkhin Gol, Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941, which was similar to the German–Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939. This pact allowed Zhukov to move the Red Army west and defend Moscow by December, 1941. One more small point, on July 9, 1941 the Enigma code was broken by British intelligence.
Of course Japan could have broken the pact, just as Hitler did. Thankfully, they did not, and Richard Sorge was able to convey that message to Moscow in a timely fashion.
Read David Glanz on Germany v USSR. Also TIK on Youtube has done lot of decent vids on the eastern front.
The Germans thought the USSR would be defeated in a matter of months. A "massive" gamble.
Even in July Hitler was talking about a peace as the resistance of the Soviets was so strong - and that they totally underestimated the Soviet army's resolve, vital British aid, size, and its superior tanks. Todt was recommending a peace in Dec 1942.
The Soviets were very incompetent right though the war. Even when the Soviets won a battle the German took a heavy toll of Soviet men.
The Soviets were receiving British supplies right up to the Battle of Moscow and after. Moscow was when the Germans were stopped - going nowhere. The Soviets pushed them back.
In 1942, the British had more troops in Syria, Iraq, Levant, in case the Germans broke into the Middle East getting at the magic oil. More men were acting as a backstop for the Soviets than were fighting Rommel in North Africa. By then the USA was in the war with an agreement for the USA and British to combine forming a western front. Otherwise British troops may have moved into the eastern front from Iran, assisting the Soviets - which was talked about. The Soviets and British invaded Iran in 1941 - few know of that. The RN controlled the eastern Med.
There was also unusual amounts of flooding in Poland that spring that would have delayed Barbarossa a few weeks even absent the Greek diversion.
Hi Adam,
my recent book Forging Global Fordism: Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and the Contest over the Industrial Order speaks to comparative strategies of military-industrial buildup in the two regimes. I also argue that we should move on from our fixation on Speer! Would be interested to hear your thoughts eventually.
Stefan
Hi Stefan. Will do. Am planning a post on Fordism soonish and will use that as an occasion to properly engage your book. Looking forward!
I agree that the economic cards were always stacked against the Third Reich. But sometimes a few lucky punches can win the match. Another dimension that illustrates "why the allies won": Intelligence. Richard Sorge informed Stalin just in time in August of 1941 that Japan had no intention of helping Hitler (believing Germany would finish off the USSR easily). That allowed the USSR to transfer hundreds of thousands of battle-tested troops to the defense of Moscow. Maybe they would have won anyways, but the way it played out, these kinds of specific actions did make a difference.
Sane people do not put the future of a whole nation down to luck. You have no control of luck.
♦ The French could have conducted a full invasion in September 1939, against a German army that was seriously depleted after Poland.
♦ The Mannstein plan could have failed, as it was no sure-fire winning solution. If the French had stopped them at Sedan.
♦ Or the French air force battered the large traffic jam on the German side.
Germany could have been overrun.
I am not arguing that trying your luck is advisable. Hitler was a reckless gambler (on top of being a racist, a genocidal madman, etc.). But there is a school of historians that argues that Axis defeat was inevitable. My point was simply that this kind of determinism underestimates the role of chance in history.
"The fact that investment is smaller when measured in 1937 prices, when industrial goods were far more abundant, is indicative of how huge the transformation was."
I'm having trouble following. Do you mind clarifying?
The truth of history, so much in request, to which every body eagerly appeals, is too often but a word. At the time of the events, during the heat of conflicting passions, it cannot exist; and if, at a later period, all parties are agreed respecting it, it is because those persons who were interested in the events, those who might be able to contradict what is asserted, are no more. What then is, generally speaking, the truth of history? A fable agreed upon. As it has been very ingeniously remarked, there are, in these matters, two essential points, very distinct from each other: the positive facts, and the moral intentions.
......Bonaparte
An interested party???