Many good points, thanks. But where does the geo-political risk lie? It lies in Brussels and Washington, not Beijing. China has no record of sanctioning the West (apart from “counter measures” in response to Western sanctions) and it is not Chinese military bases that surround Europe and N America threatening a conflict. It is not China that is actively undermining the UN-based global order, it is not China that is sabotaging the WTO.
The geopolitical risk will disappear overnight if Washington and Brussels see Beijing as a partner in the fight to protect the global climate and biodiversity. It disappears when Washington and Brussels actively work to support Taiwan’s peaceful reunification with the mainland (on terms which protects Taiwanese democracy). The political risks disappear once Washington and Brussels start cooperating with China on research and development, vs trying to block China’s technological development.
The geopolitical risk lies with Washington and Brussels. They could easily end them.
The Chinese state is totalitarian and deeply unpleasant. Ethnic cleansing and repression are central to it. Thankfully it has no serious claims on other countries, and a large and fragile empire it needs to protect; maybe we'll be lucky, and the absurd pantomime in the South China Sea and the Himalayas is as nasty as it will get (at least outside China's borders - inside them, it has been genocidal for a long time). We are where we are, but bullshit is dangerous.
Thanks for reading and responding to my comment. I doubt whatever I say will change your view of China being “totalitarian, but there is in fact much more evidence of Western totalitarianism than there is of Chinese totalitarianism. Just think of how American police deal with dissent, and how HK and mainland police deal with dissent. No one (or hardly anyone) is killed by the police in China, but so many people keep dying at the hands of American police. You just have to look at the world objectively to see why I claim there is much more evidence of American totalitarianism. And also read more broadly, especially on how the CIA covertly works with terrorists to destabilise regimes that do not tow the US line.
Thanks for reading and responding to my comment. I doubt whatever I say will change your view of China being “totalitarian, but there is in fact much more evidence of Western totalitarianism than there is of Chinese totalitarianism. Just think of how American police deal with dissent, and how HK and mainland police deal with dissent. No one (or hardly anyone) is killed by the police in China, but so many people keep dying at the hands of American police. You just have to look at the world objectively to see why I claim there is much more evidence of American totalitarianism. And also read more broadly, especially on how the CIA covertly works with terrorists to destabilise regimes that do not tow the US line.
Scholz and von der Leyen have neither the German people nor Europeans more generally, let alone the business interests of either, foremost in mind when they make their pronouncements -- they're singing from their Atlanticist hymnbooks, reality be damned ...
Very interesting. I can well accept that the risk of a Taiwan Straits crisis is too low and too hypothetical for businesses to worry about. But I'm curious: how should those of us whose main intellectual interest is not so much business and economics, but politics and international relations, assess such a risk, in this case and in general? I ask this here in part because our esteemed blogger is a scholar whose knowledge and interest spans all four areas. I would stress that I do not have developed ideas of my own about how high (or low) the risk is in this case. Rather, I'm truly curious, how does one assess the risk of sudden breakdowns in major power relations, in general, and then how would one apply such an understanding to this case?
The decisive point was Germany's economy being torpedoed - with full awareness, don't be fooled - by the US sanctions regime. Not to speak of the impotent non-response to the NordStream incident.
German car markers' collapse in the global market is just a matter of time. They'll be able to compete for a small share of the European market, but GM will probably force them out of most of that market also, and no local politician will have the guts to say a word.
You are reinforcing my strong impression that this is the Chinese Century. All those who acknowledge this and avail thereof will be gaining a distinct advantage. Those who are trying to stem the flow of goods are risking everything and causing inflation to boot.
If we throw resources at the problem and all goes well, we will be able to supply domestic EV battery manufacturers with graphite by 2028. Until then, China controls the graphite market and we don't know who will control our trade policy. The idea that we can compete –even if we cheat– with China in any field is just juvenile. We can't.
Many good points, thanks. But where does the geo-political risk lie? It lies in Brussels and Washington, not Beijing. China has no record of sanctioning the West (apart from “counter measures” in response to Western sanctions) and it is not Chinese military bases that surround Europe and N America threatening a conflict. It is not China that is actively undermining the UN-based global order, it is not China that is sabotaging the WTO.
The geopolitical risk will disappear overnight if Washington and Brussels see Beijing as a partner in the fight to protect the global climate and biodiversity. It disappears when Washington and Brussels actively work to support Taiwan’s peaceful reunification with the mainland (on terms which protects Taiwanese democracy). The political risks disappear once Washington and Brussels start cooperating with China on research and development, vs trying to block China’s technological development.
The geopolitical risk lies with Washington and Brussels. They could easily end them.
The Chinese state is totalitarian and deeply unpleasant. Ethnic cleansing and repression are central to it. Thankfully it has no serious claims on other countries, and a large and fragile empire it needs to protect; maybe we'll be lucky, and the absurd pantomime in the South China Sea and the Himalayas is as nasty as it will get (at least outside China's borders - inside them, it has been genocidal for a long time). We are where we are, but bullshit is dangerous.
This is the kind of juvenile, fantastical thinking that leads to many of the forecasting errors exposed in the article.
Thanks for reading and responding to my comment. I doubt whatever I say will change your view of China being “totalitarian, but there is in fact much more evidence of Western totalitarianism than there is of Chinese totalitarianism. Just think of how American police deal with dissent, and how HK and mainland police deal with dissent. No one (or hardly anyone) is killed by the police in China, but so many people keep dying at the hands of American police. You just have to look at the world objectively to see why I claim there is much more evidence of American totalitarianism. And also read more broadly, especially on how the CIA covertly works with terrorists to destabilise regimes that do not tow the US line.
Thanks for reading and responding to my comment. I doubt whatever I say will change your view of China being “totalitarian, but there is in fact much more evidence of Western totalitarianism than there is of Chinese totalitarianism. Just think of how American police deal with dissent, and how HK and mainland police deal with dissent. No one (or hardly anyone) is killed by the police in China, but so many people keep dying at the hands of American police. You just have to look at the world objectively to see why I claim there is much more evidence of American totalitarianism. And also read more broadly, especially on how the CIA covertly works with terrorists to destabilise regimes that do not tow the US line.
Scholz and von der Leyen have neither the German people nor Europeans more generally, let alone the business interests of either, foremost in mind when they make their pronouncements -- they're singing from their Atlanticist hymnbooks, reality be damned ...
Very interesting. I can well accept that the risk of a Taiwan Straits crisis is too low and too hypothetical for businesses to worry about. But I'm curious: how should those of us whose main intellectual interest is not so much business and economics, but politics and international relations, assess such a risk, in this case and in general? I ask this here in part because our esteemed blogger is a scholar whose knowledge and interest spans all four areas. I would stress that I do not have developed ideas of my own about how high (or low) the risk is in this case. Rather, I'm truly curious, how does one assess the risk of sudden breakdowns in major power relations, in general, and then how would one apply such an understanding to this case?
Great.Thank you.The West is not realizing the extent of China´s progess in manufacturing and technology in the last few years.
Eugenio Bregolat,former Ambassador of Spain to China and Russia
The decisive point was Germany's economy being torpedoed - with full awareness, don't be fooled - by the US sanctions regime. Not to speak of the impotent non-response to the NordStream incident.
German car markers' collapse in the global market is just a matter of time. They'll be able to compete for a small share of the European market, but GM will probably force them out of most of that market also, and no local politician will have the guts to say a word.
Absolutely.
You are reinforcing my strong impression that this is the Chinese Century. All those who acknowledge this and avail thereof will be gaining a distinct advantage. Those who are trying to stem the flow of goods are risking everything and causing inflation to boot.
Uyghurs beg to differ about “totalitarianism.” The west is far from perfect but dissent is tolerated.
This is why, of course, America will resort to war.
More or less implicit in the article is the idea that China is “the” market to be because of its leadership in EVs, rather than only market size.
If so, we should check where the carmakers investment has been going. Are they joining the EV race or merely expanding combustion engine capacity?
Surprisingly short-sighted and blinkered piece.
https://pekingreadout.substack.com/p/is-germany-and-eus-de-risking-strategy
If we throw resources at the problem and all goes well, we will be able to supply domestic EV battery manufacturers with graphite by 2028. Until then, China controls the graphite market and we don't know who will control our trade policy. The idea that we can compete –even if we cheat– with China in any field is just juvenile. We can't.