Keep in mind that the auto industry is dependent on semiconductors. If the technology value chains suffer a disruption, the auto industry is disrupted. This sensitivity also effects medical, industrial machines and robots, everything.
I found this entirely fascinating. Thank you. It highlights the importance of networks, of which I know not much, and their dynamics, of which I know even less. Questions though, 1) how does trade-related finance compare with speculative finance, 2) what are the similar “pictures” of speculation, including criminal and commodities, and 3) how is climate change and biodiversity collapse affecting global finance?
Perhaps the new Sino-Russian reserve/settlement currency will restore that growth curve to its former glory, though it is unlikely to benefit the West.
The framing is right, but it misses the cost structure story. Globalization isn't ending, it's getting heavier. Every surviving trade route now carries friction: sanctions compliance, dual-use screening, near-shoring premiums. The question isn't whether the network persists, but who absorbs the new drag. Wrote about this structural shift what I call the end of frictionless globalization https://thegreyswan.substack.com/p/end-of-frictionless-globalization
Keep in mind that the auto industry is dependent on semiconductors. If the technology value chains suffer a disruption, the auto industry is disrupted. This sensitivity also effects medical, industrial machines and robots, everything.
I found this entirely fascinating. Thank you. It highlights the importance of networks, of which I know not much, and their dynamics, of which I know even less. Questions though, 1) how does trade-related finance compare with speculative finance, 2) what are the similar “pictures” of speculation, including criminal and commodities, and 3) how is climate change and biodiversity collapse affecting global finance?
Perhaps the new Sino-Russian reserve/settlement currency will restore that growth curve to its former glory, though it is unlikely to benefit the West.
The framing is right, but it misses the cost structure story. Globalization isn't ending, it's getting heavier. Every surviving trade route now carries friction: sanctions compliance, dual-use screening, near-shoring premiums. The question isn't whether the network persists, but who absorbs the new drag. Wrote about this structural shift what I call the end of frictionless globalization https://thegreyswan.substack.com/p/end-of-frictionless-globalization