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Rocky's avatar

"For us to revel in mythic references to the 1940s and 'the American story' is a shameful, sentimental self-indulgence. If we are to evoke the past at all, let us do so in a critical and exploratory fashion."

Why?

Maybe there is value in adopting a vision of what we want to be, even if it isn't exactly what we are or have been. As Lincoln pointed out on many occasions, the Declaration of Independence's bold claims about equality did not reflect at all the state of equality in America at its writing, but it was the most important of American documents precisely because it set forth our ideals. Who we saw ourselves as ultimately led us to become more like that. This is not to say that critical examination of America is wrong, but rather that rejecting our ideals because of past hypocrisy surrounding them is foolish and wrong.

Lend-Lease is a mythical narrative in Russia just as much as it is in America. Branding our aid to Ukraine is not likely to cause Russia to reflect it as more hostile, it will instead recall the historical circumstances of the first case even to their minds. If we gloss over the small details even in the US, so will they surely not come to see it in these critical terms as a "trap" likely to ensure war. Just the action of calling it Lend-Lease itself does not reasonably push us further into escalation, it is in fact a propaganda of shame which may help deescalate if anything.

So I cannot help but feel that this article really isn't about the calling of it Lend-Lease, but more a cautionary tale about escalation implicit in real material aid to Ukraine under the guise of a cautionary tale about mythologizing. And that is a much more uncomfortable conversation, because I think the fault lines are less academic and more political than Tooze is admitting here. It is really a discussion of how much are we all willing to risk our own lives for the lives of strangers, i.e. the same debate that existed back then.

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Charles Knapp's avatar

On the international law aspect of Lend Lease, Mulder’s book on sanctions suggests that the US policy was within that (by then) established framework that had rewritten the laws applicable to neutral nations. So I’m no longer convinced it was such a black and white situation as was referenced in your piece.

I had understood that Hitler’s antisemitism played a significant role in how he viewed the US and the inevitability of conflict with it. The books cited only reinforce this view.

Nevertheless, the recent antisemitic comments by Russian FM Lavrov, which do not appear to be shared by Putin, might better be understood as a political framework to keep the Russian public on side as the toll of the conflict becomes more evident. Sadly, there is a deeply ingrained streak of antisemitism that has always permeated Russian Orthodoxy and, as a result, the larger Russian society. It’s not an iron rule applicable to all, but it seems a majoritarian impulse nevertheless.

Ultimately, the aims of Germany were contrary to American national interests and the reality was that there could be no accommodation, war was coming and the only question was whether the US might still have Allies standing when it arrived. If what I wrote is an accurate assessment, and there’s no way to know, then Lend Lease made, as the saying about diplomacy has it, the inevitable happen sooner.

How does this all affect our thinking about Putin? Will he take the view, if pushed to the wall and sees no exit, that (like Hitler in his bunker) it was not a personal miscalculation but a failure of the Russian people who proved themselves unworthy of their historical mission. Will that translate into Putin reaching for the Apocalypse? Or, if enough bad news continues to flow from the Ukraine misadventure, will Putin be removed internally? We cannot possibly know.

The problem in international affairs is what a resolution might look like and to what extent it may be said to reward aggression. Russia’s apparent brutality (even factoring in some element of media exaggeration) and conscription in the Donbas (if true) might well turn Ukraine’s russophone population against Russia. Then Putin has no face saving exit but potentially a long, grinding counter-insurgency on his hands.

Back to your article’s point, I think matters have evolved since WWII and both proxy wars and the syphoning of armaments and intelligence to a belligerent without yourself declaring war are fairly well established. The question is whether Russia will now change those rules.

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